Multisender authentication codes allow a group of senders to construct an authenticated message for a receiver such that the receiver can verify the authenticity of the received message. In this paper, we construct one multisender authentication code from polynomials over finite fields. Some parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of this code are also computed.
Introduction
Multisender authentication code was firstly constructed by Gilbert et al. [1] in 1974. Multisender authentication system refers to who a group of senders, cooperatively send a message to a receiver; then the receiver should be able to ascertain that the message is authentic. About this case, many scholars and researchers had made great contributions to multisender authentication codes, such as [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] .
In the actual computer network communications, multisender authentication codes include sequential model and simultaneous model. Sequential model is that each sender uses his own encoding rules to encode a source state orderly, the last sender sends the encoded message to the receiver, and the receiver receives the message and verifies whether the message is legal or not. Simultaneous model is that all senders use their own encoding rules to encode a source state, and each sender sends the encoded message to the synthesizer, respectively; then the synthesizer forms an authenticated message and verifies whether the message is legal or not. In this paper, we will adopt the second model. In a simultaneous model, there are four participants: a group of senders = { 1 , 2 , . . . , }, the key distribution center, he is responsible for the key distribution to senders and receiver, including solving the disputes between them, a receiver , and a synthesizer, where he only runs the trusted synthesis algorithm. The code works as follows: each sender and receiver has their own Cartesian authentication code, respectively. Let ( , , ; ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) be the senders' Cartesian authentication code, ( , , ; ) be the receiver's Cartesian authentication code, ℎ : 1 × 2 × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × → be the synthesis algorithm, and : → be a subkey generation algorithm, where is the key set of the key distribution center. When authenticating a message, the senders and the receiver should comply with the protocol. The key distribution center randomly selects an encoding rule ∈ and sends = ( ) to the th sender ( = 1, 2, . . . , ), secretly; then he calculates by according to an effective algorithm and secretly sends to the receiver . If the senders would like to send a source state to the receiver , computes = ( , ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) and sends = ( , ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) to the synthesizer through an open channel. The synthesizer receives the message = ( , ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) and calculates = ℎ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) by the synthesis algorithm ℎ and then sends message = ( , ) to the receiver; he checks the authenticity by verifying whether = ( , ) or not. If the equality holds, the message is authentic and is accepted. Otherwise, the message is rejected.
We assume that the key distribution center is credible, and though he know the senders' and receiver's encoding rules, he will not participate in any communication activities. When transmitters and receiver are disputing, the key distribution center settles it. At the same time, we assume that the system follows the Kerckhoff principle in which, except the actual used keys, the other information of the whole system is public.
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In a multisender authentication system, we assume that the whole senders are cooperative to form a valid message; that is, all senders as a whole and receiver are reliable. But there are some malicious senders who together cheat the receiver; the part of senders and receiver are not credible, and they can take impersonation attack and substitution attack. In the whole system, we assume that { 1 , 2 , . . . , } are senders, is a receiver, is the encoding rules set of the sender , and is the decoding rules set of the receiver . If the source state space and the key space of receiver are according to a uniform distribution, then the message space and the tag space are determined by the probability distribution of and .
, . . . , }. Now consider that let us consider the attacks from malicious groups of senders. Here, there are two kinds of attack.
The opponent's impersonation attack to receiver: , after receiving their secret keys, encode a message and send it to the receiver.
are successful if the receiver accepts it as legitimate message. Denote by the largest probability of some opponent's successful impersonation attack to receiver; it can be expressed as
The opponent's substitution attack to the receiver: replace with another message , after they observe a legitimate message . are successful if the receiver accepts it as legitimate message; it can be expressed as
There might be malicious senders who together cheat the receiver; that is, the part of senders and the receiver are not credible, and they can take impersonation attack.
, . . . , }, after receiving their secret keys, send a message to the receiver ; are successful if the receiver accepts it as legitimate message. Denote by ( ) the maximum probability of success of the impersonation attack to the receiver. It can be expressed as
Notes. ( , ) ̸ = 0 implies that any information encoded by can be authenticated by . In [2] , Desmedt et al. gave two constructions for MRAcodes based on polynomials and finite geometries, respectively. To construct multisender or multireceiver authentication by polynomials over finite fields, many researchers have done much work, for example, [7] [8] [9] . There are other constructions of multisender authentication codes that are given in [3] [4] [5] [6] . The construction of authentication codes is combinational design in its nature. We know that the polynomial over finite fields can provide a better algebra structure and is easy to count. In this paper, we construct one multisender authentication code from the polynomial over finite fields. Some parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of this code are also computed. We realize the generalization and the application of the similar idea and method of the paper [7] [8] [9] .
Some Results about Finite Field
Let be the finite field with elements, where is a power of a prime and is a field containing ; denote by * be the nonzero elements set of . In this paper, we will use the following conclusions over finite fields. More results about finite fields can be found in [10] [11] [12] .
Construction
Let the polynomial
, where the coefficient ∈ , (1 ≤ ≤ ), and these vectors by the composition of their coefficient are linearly independent. The set of source states = ; the set of th transmitter's encoding rules = { 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ), ∈ * } (1 ≤ ≤ ); the set of receiver's encoding rules = { 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ), where is a primitive element of }; the set of th transmitter's tags = { | ∈ } (1 ≤ ≤ ); the set of receiver's tags = { | ∈ }.
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Define the encoding map : × → , ( , ) =
The code works as follows. Assume that is larger than, or equal to, the number of the possible message and ≤ . ) is linearly independent. He selects distinct nonzero elements 1 , 2 , . . . , ∈ again and makes (1 ≤ ≤ ) secret; then he sends privately 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ) to the sender (1 ≤ ≤ ). The key distribution center also randomly chooses a primitive element of satisfying 1 + 2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = and sends 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ) to the receiver .
Broadcast.
If the senders want to send a source state ∈ to the receiver , the sender calculates = ( , ) = ( ) = 1 ( ) + 
It follows that 
. . . ) .
The above linear equation is equivalent to = , because the column vectors of are linearly independent, is equivalent to a Vandermonde matrix, and is inverse; therefore, the above linear equation has a unique solution, so is only defined; that is, (1 ≤ ≤ ) is a surjection.
(2) If ∈ is another source state satisfying 1 ( ) + 
(8)
Similar to (1), we know that the homogeneous linear equation = 0 has a unique solution; that is, there is only zero solution, so = . So, is the unique source state determined by and ; thus, (1 ≤ ≤ ) is an A-code.
Lemma 2. Let = ( , , , ); then the code is an A-code.
Proof.
(1) For any ∈ , ∈ , from the definition of , we assume that = { 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ), where is a primitive element of }, ( , ) = 1 ( ) + 
that is, ( ,
, . . . , ) ( , . . . , ) is linearly independent and the column vectors of are also linearly independent; therefore, the above linear equation has unique solution, so is only defined; that is, is a surjection. , . . . , ) ( − ) = 0 has a unique solution; that is, there is only zero solution, so = ; that is, = . So, is the unique source state determined by and ; thus, = ( , , , ) is an A-code.
At the same time, for any valid = ( , ), we have known that = 1 + 2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + , and it follows that
We also have known
where is a nonnegative power of character of , and we get From Lemmas 1 and 2, we know that such construction of multisender authentication codes is reasonable and there are senders in this system. Next, we compute the parameters of this code and the maximum probability of success in impersonation attack and substitution attack by the group of senders. ) is linear independent.
Theorem 3. Some parameters of this construction are
| | = , | | = [ ( −1)/2 ∏ = − +1 ( − 1)] ( −1 1 ) = [ ( −1)/2 ∏ = − +1 ( − 1)]( − 1) (1 ≤ ≤ ), | | = (1 ≤ ≤ ), | | = [ ( −1)/2 ∏ = − +1 (−
Journal of Applied Mathematics 5
From Conclusion 5, we can conclude that the number of satisfying the condition is ( −1)/2 ∏ = − +1 ( − 1). On the other hand, the number of distinct nonzero elements (1 ≤ ≤ ) in is ( by the theory of the group, we know that the number of generator of * is ( − 1); that is, the number of is ( − 1). 
Lemma 4.
For any ∈ , the number of contained is ( − 1). , . . . , is linearly independent, so ( − ) (
) is arbitrarily; therefore, − = 0; that is, = , and it follows that is only determined by . Therefore, as ∈ , for any given and , the number of contained in is ( − 1).
Lemma 5.
For any = ( , ) ∈ and = ( , ) ∈ with ̸ = , the number of contained and is 1.
Proof. Assume that = { 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ), where is a primitive element of } ∈
. If ⊂ and ⊂ , then 1 ( ) + , . . . , and the column vectors of both are linearly independent, it forces that = ; this is a contradiction. Therefore, we get
since , is given, ( − ) −1 is unique, by equation ( * ), for any given , and , , we obtain that ( ,
, . . . , ) is only determined; thus, the number of contained and is 1. Proof. For any fixed = { 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ), ∈ * } (1 ≤ ≤ ) containing a given , we assume that 
Lemma 7.
For any fixed = { 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ), ∈ * } (1 ≤ ≤ ) containing a given and = ( , ), the number of which is incidence with and contained in is 1.
Proof. For any ∈ , ∈ , we assume that = { 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ), where is a primitive element of }. Similar to Lemma 6, for any fixed = { 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ), ∈ * }, (1 ≤ ≤ ) containing a given , we have known that is incident with if and only if
Again, with ⊂ , we can get
By (11) and (12) and the property of ( ) (1 ≤ ≤ ), we have the following conclusion: 
because is any given. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4, we can get (∑ =1 1 ( ), ∑ =1 2 ( ), . . . , ∑ =1 ( )) − ((∑ =1 ) ,(∑ =1 ) −1 , . . . ,(∑ =1 )) = 0; that is, ((∑ =1 ) , (∑ =1 ) −1 , . . . , (∑ =1 )) = (∑ =1 1 ( ), ∑ =1 2 ( ), . . . , ∑ =1 ( )), but 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( ) and (1 ≤ ≤ ) also are fixed; thus, and are only determined, so the number of which is incident with and contained in is 1. 
